Since multinational corporations began entering China in the 1980s, the trickle has grown to a torrent, and today nearly every CEO is required to have a strategy for their company's involvement in China. The combination of China's participation in the world economy, accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the growing presence of foreign companies in China was supposed to help bring China into line with international standards of governance, including rule of law and eventually human rights. In some sectors progress is clearly visible. Representatives of multinationals frequently bring suits against the Chinese state in the form of the patent or trademark bureau in Beijing's First Intermediate Court. Such cases have become routine, and while some foreign litigants still complain about delays and the quality of some proceedings, litigation runs at something approaching an international standard.
1 Yet in any given year, outside of this single chamber in a single court in a single city in a country of over a billion people, only a small handful of foreign litigants will directly challenge the Chinese state in court.
Instead, disagreements between foreign multinationals and other parts of the Chinese state will most likely be settled in direct meetings with officials. Foreign companies are anxious to not endanger vital relationships with local governments and local officials are usually eager to encourage international investment to help them meet development quotas, impress their superiors and receive promotions. In general, companies prefer to avoid litigation, but in China even if a dispute proves difficult to resolve, multinationals may turn to other resources and tactics, and rarely, if ever, consider litigating against the state. Indeed, foreign lawyers in China who would willingly recommend litigation against China's Trademark and Patent Bureaus frequently looked horrified when I asked about suing local governments.
This paper argues that this discrepancy is part of a compromise between the Chinese state and multinationals operating in China. 2 The "groping for stones to cross the river [摸着石头过 河]" approach that has been a hallmark of China's Reform-era government means that instead of using a foreign presence to motivate reform and improve the administrative legal system, the state creates an effective but ad hoc solution to fix problems affecting foreigners. For their part, multinationals are given the incredible opportunity of access to the People's Republic of China (PRC), both as a market and as a production site. Additionally, they are given a venue for
Intellectual Property (IP) disputes with the state, 3 and the reasonable expectation of favorable treatment by local governments, especially outside the largest and most developed coastal cities.
In return, the Chinese state receives foreign investments that include intellectual property because foreign firms are at least minimally comfortable that their intellectual property will be protected and that there will be reasonable recourse if it is not. The Chinese state can therefore continue to enjoy this foreign investment without significant foreign pressure to make costly reforms granting independence to its justice system.
Specifically, this paper addresses the following points. I first consider the theoretical implications for legal convergence, authoritarian resilience and the relationship between rule of law and development. After addressing my data sources, I turn my attention to the Intellectual Property Chamber of Beijing's First Intermediate Court, the exception to the rule that multinationals do not sue the Chinese state. I then show that although administrative litigation has become an imperfect but still viable mechanism for both individuals and firms to resolve problems with the state, multinationals rarely resort to suing the Chinese state. I demonstrate that although foreign firms may have difficulty litigating against the Chinese government; and using an example, I show that it is on balance no more difficult for them than most other classes of plaintiffs. I consider the following reasons that multinationals shy from litigation: 1) Their perceptions of administrative litigation in China are founded on a received wisdom based on a familiar criticism of Chinese rule of law rather than on empirical reality or experience; 2) Their activities are sometimes of dubious legality; and 3) They often have a wealth of extra-legal alternatives. Finally, I conclude that while the reluctance of multinationals to engage the Chinese state in litigation is understandable, multinationals' reluctance to make use of administrative courts and preference for extra-legal special treatment severely limits their potential contribution to China's rule of law.
Theory
This paper is a careful, empirical, close to the ground study in an area generally dominated by theorizing, multi-country studies, sweeping generalizations and analyses of black letter law. It adds much needed data to several important theoretical debates including: legal convergence, authoritarian resilience, and the relationship between rule of law and development.
As a careful empirical study, however, it does not come up with easy or definitive answers.
Nevertheless, I will briefly cover some of the relevant theoretical issues in this section.
An important theoretical issue touched on by this research is the relationship between rule of law and development. Rule of law is frequently seen as a precondition for economic development because it enforces contracts and property rights, creating certainty, and thereby encouraging investment. 4 China is sometimes cited as an outlier or exception by achieving spectacular growth without establishing rule of law. China's administrative law system, it then follows that that they would also be contributing to the protection of human rights in China.
The aim of this paper is not to argue that legal convergence is not occurring in China. 
Data Sources
The data for this article is drawn primarily from interviews and e-mail interactions My informants were selected more or less randomly, from among these big-name firms, depending on who was available and willing to give me an interview. I conducted an additional five interviews with other lawyers who were recommended to me as having had some experience with foreign involved administrative litigation in China. I also sent e-mails seeking information to at least one lawyer at each of 50 foreign law firms in Hong Kong that deal with PRC law. I received 13 responses, none of which, however, implied significant experience with administrative litigation and was judged therefore to warrant an interview. 21 Appelbaum, "The Future of Law," 171. 22 Intellectual property firms in China specialize in assisting clients with intellectual property issues such as patent registration and may also represent clients in IP-related litigation. They employ both lawyers and non-lawyer patent agents, both of which may represent their clients in IP-related litigation.
As part of the larger project on administrative litigation, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 126 lawyers from randomly selected law firms in Beijing, Shanghai, Ningbo, Changsha, Guilin and a prefecture in rural Hunan. At four of the sites, twenty firms were chosen at random from official registers of all local law firms in the area. In Beijing thirty firms were chosen, and in rural Hunan every firm was included in the sample since there were fewer than twenty law firms in the entire prefecture. To increase efficiency, if a sampled firm shared a building with other firms, additional interviews were sought with up to three of those firms, chosen randomly if more than three were present. The inclusion of these firms had the additional advantage of capturing at least one firm that was too new to be on the official register, 23 though these registers were never more than a year and a half old. The overall response rate was a respectable 68.5%. Finally, these interviews were supplemented by an additional 19 interviews with former government officials, former judges, legal scholars, legal workers, and actual, as well as potential, plaintiffs. While these interviews provided a wealth of knowledge about administrative litigation in China and an important point of comparison, the vast majority of
Chinese law firms never interact with foreign parties and my random sample of firms therefore yielded little direct information about foreign involved administrative litigation.
Interviews ranged in length from 20 minutes to 4 hours depending on the experience and availability of the informant. With the exception of foreign lawyers, all interviews were conducted in Mandarin. To facilitate more honest conversation and to protect the anonymity of informants, no audio recordings were made of any of these interviews.
While most sections of this paper rest on data gathered through these interviews, in one section I also use official PRC data from national and provincial legal yearbooks to test the common wisdom expressed in interviews that multinationals rarely sue the state. Official data published by the Chinese government are justifiably treated with skepticism, and data on litigation is no exception. Empirical research has suggested that courts exaggerate the true number of cases they hear to make themselves look more productive and this is primarily true of less busy courts in poorer areas. 24 For our purposes in this analysis, however, there is no reason One of the most important reasons multinationals feel comfortable litigating against TRAB and PRB is that these departments are accustomed to being litigated against. As we shall see, the chief concern that makes multinationals reluctant to sue a government department is not the fear that they will lose, but the fear this will hurt their future relationship with the department they are suing. Additionally, officials of these bodies do actually show up in court to defend their 
Non-Litigiousness
One of the central conceits of this paper is that aside from cases in Beijing's intellectual property court, foreign firms generally do not sue the Chinese state. This assertion is not controversial and, in foreign business and legal circles in China, it is in fact the received wisdom.
As the experienced head counsel of a large foreign multinational with a long history in China put it "as a matter of principle, we would not think about resorting to administrative litigation." 34 As with so much received wisdom, however, no one has as yet gone to the trouble to make a systematic and convincing empirical case that foreign firms rarely resort to administrative litigation, and since this is the starting point of my analysis I will do so here. Tables 1   and 2. 35 Interview: LZ02-L. While the sudden uptick in administrative litigation cases with foreigners involved in 1998 looks encouraging, Table 2 suggests that it might be an anomaly rather than the beginning of a dramatic upward trend. In the one overlapping year of Tables 1 and 2 , 1998, Guangdong alone appears to be responsible for just over a quarter of all foreign involved administrative cases. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any national level statistics after 1998 that shed light on foreign involvement in administrative litigation. We shall now examine the provincial level statistics from Guangdong. it is undoubtedly one the areas in which we could expect to find more foreign-related litigation.
As well shall see, however, these figures compare poorly to foreign involvement in civil litigation in Guangdong in the same period.
36 Interview: BJ07-PA. 37 Interview: BJ07-PA. in Shanghai or Beijing rarely sued these jurisdictions because they seldom had problems with these more sophisticated and rule-abiding local governments.
Foreign firms in China are generally reluctant to litigate even in civil cases, but the following statistical tests using data from Guangdong show that they are statistically significantly more likely to engage in civil litigation than administrative litigation. I use an independent group T-test to compare the mean percentage of foreign involved administrative cases and the mean percentage of foreign involved tort and contract cases. The results in Table 3 show that foreign parties were involved in over twice the percentage of tort and contract cases, although the percentage of overall cases is tiny. Table 4 is similar to Table 3 except that it compares administrative cases exclusively to contract cases. Again, we see that although foreign parties make up only a tiny percentage of both types of litigation in China, foreign parties still make up a statistically significantly larger share of civil litigation. While much of the quantitative data used in this section is perforce less than ideal, it does serve to corroborate the claim, already supported by received wisdom and my interviews, that foreign firms in China engage in relatively little administrative litigation.
An Example
To better understand why foreign companies and the Chinese and foreign law firms that represent them are reluctant to recommend litigation against the state, it is instructive to examine more closely one of the few examples of a non-IP foreign involved administrative case.
In the early 2000s, a foreign company's joint venture with a Chinese firm had run into trouble with the customs department in a large Chinese port. 47 A few million US dollars worth of product that the company had imported had gone missing in the port and was then sold on the local market. 48 The joint venture requested an administrative review of the local customs agent's action which was conducted by the national customs agency since the port city's customs was directly under their supervision. 49 When the results of the review did not prove satisfactory, the joint venture approached the large multinational law firm that was its Hong Kong based counsel.
The firm recommended three potential Chinese law firms in the port city to represent them in the matter and the joint venture chose the largest local law firm. Assisted by its Hong Kong counsel and represented in China by the local firm, the joint venture took the national customs department to administrative court.
Despite having devoted significant funds to legal fees, especially for the foreign law firm, the joint venture ultimately lost, both in the first instance and on appeal. As sometimes happens in Chinese administrative cases, the judge explained the political situation that would not allow him to rule for the plaintiff, "we cannot let you win this case, because this is linked to… [a large smuggling] case." 50 The officials in question in the administrative suit appeared to also be defendants in a large criminal smuggling case and apparently this made the joint venture's law suit simply too hot for the administrative courts to handle. Additionally, since the case had already gone through the administrative review process and the decision was confirmed by national level customs, if the court found for the plaintiff it would be ruling against a national level department, something Chinese administrative courts are loath to do.
Something of a compromise was made. The joint-venture agreed not to pursue the case any further, and the customs department agreed not to take any action against the company in an apparently unrelated issue that was pending against the joint venture. This case displays many of the problems that are common among all kinds of administrative litigation in China. It also demonstrates that the problems faced by multinationals in China are not necessarily any different than those of any administrative plaintiff described in my dissertation. It seems unlikely that any domestic firm would have fared any better under the same circumstances.
Helping or Hurting? Foreign Involvement
Despite the admittedly numerous flaws in the operations of China's administrative courts it is not immediately apparent just why multinationals engage in less administrative than civil litigation or why they engage in less administrative litigation than their domestic counterparts. In this section, the goal is to show that multinationals, if anything, are in a stronger position in regard to administrative litigation than are their domestic counterparts.
The issue of how multinationals behave in China is made all the more complicated by the fact that many of them are not technically multinationals. In the early stages of China's reform era, many foreign firms could only get access to China by setting up joint ventures with Chinese partners. By 1997 wholly-foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) had become the investment format of choice and more and more foreign investment has taken this form. 51 New difficulties arise, however, from the Variable Interest Entity (VIE) or "Sina structure" that "has been used for years primarily to circumvent China's rules that ban foreigners from investing in certain sectors such as internet and telecommunication." 52 How joint ventures or VIEs deal with problems with the Chinese state may depend heavily on how their Chinese partners approach the problem.
For the most part, both foreign and domestic plaintiffs face the same problems that plague administrative litigation generally in China. Judges may be reluctant to take administrative cases because they are likely to be more difficult, controversial and time consuming. 53 The Supreme People's Court (SPC) has in some instances issued decisions requiring lower courts not to hear certain kinds of cases. 54 The CCP, its representatives and actions may not be challenged in court. This is especially problematic because it can be difficult to differentiate party from state, and officials use this ambiguity to their advantage. 55 Only concrete government actions, not abstract decisions, may be pursued in the administrative legal system. 56 Furthermore, courts sometimes undermine plaintiffs' right to sue by questioning whether they constitute "directly affected parties" 57 . Even if a case is accepted, courts can be reluctant to upset the local governments that control their budgets or the local People's Congresses that are largely responsible for appointing and dismissing judges. 58 Legal consciousness among officials is low and many do not believe that they can or should be held responsible by courts. Consequently, they may refuse to show up in court and hide or destroy evidence. 59 While the State Compensation Law has recently been amended to broaden standards for compensation, awards in the past have often been ridiculously small 60 and the vast majority of administrative cases involve no compensation, not even to cover the victorious plaintiff's legal fees. 61 While the enforcement of administrative verdicts is probably substantially better than the enforcement of civil verdicts, 62 receiving compensation or ensuring that the state complies with an administrative court's verdict can sometimes prove problematic.
63
Despite these widely recognized problems with administrative litigation in China, the success rates, at least for cases accepted by courts 64 , are reasonably good. 65 I consider the success rates of administrative litigation extensively in the third chapter of my dissertation and estimate that they peaked at just under 45% in 1996, but have since fallen into the teens. While this may not sound inspiring, they still signal a reasonable chance of success, especially considering they are probably better than the odds of winning a suit against the governments of the United States, Taiwan or Japan.
66
There may be, however, areas in which foreign firms face advantages or disadvantages in administrative litigation. Indeed, even the simple involvement of a foreigner in any litigation in China already makes a case more sensitive. The added sensitivity of foreign participation may sometimes result in an otherwise banal case being rejected simply because judges may fear it is too sensitive to handle. 67 Unlike judges in more independent judicial systems, Chinese judges may be penalized for what their superiors consider an "incorrect ruling" and the more sensitive or important the case, the more damaging the potential consequences for a judge. As we saw in the example of the customs case, suing a higher level of government can also increase the level of sensitivity. Multinationals are probably more likely to have disputes with higher-level administrative agencies than their domestic counterparts, and may therefore find administrative litigation to be more challenging for that reason.
On the other hand, multinationals do appear to have some advantages over their domestic counterparts. Foreign involved cases start one level higher up the judicial system than totally domestic litigation. For example, first instance cases that would normally be heard in a lower level court will start in an intermediate court. Because higher-level judges are usually better qualified and less prone to corruption and local protectionism, this can help foreign companies.
Some informants suggested that courts would be more conscientious in cases involving foreign parties, perhaps being more polite and patient. 68 Another suggested that they might receive favorable treatment in courts outside Beijing and Shanghai where foreign presence is rarer.
69
Multinationals should not be reluctant to litigate because they lack sufficient grounds for litigation. Because it is common for every department at every level to have different sets of regulations, lawyers experienced with administrative litigation are generally able to find 66 Ultimately, however, whether a party is foreign or domestic, much more likely to have an impact on a case are variables such as the professionalism of the relevant court and defendant department, the quality of the legal case, the quality of legal counsel, the sensitivity of the issue and the connections and stature of the two parties. As one Chinese lawyer put it: "why would the courts treat Chinese and foreign parties differently, because the color of their hair is different?"
74

Conceptions, Misconceptions and Missed Conceptions
As we have seen, Chinese administrative litigation is problematic at the best of times. Yet, what foreign firms are most concerned with in administrative cases is that a relatively direct and confrontational tactic such as litigation will be likely to sour their relationship with specific offices or units of the Chinese state that they can expect to encounter time and time again as they conduct business in China. Even if they were to win, both plaintiffs and lawyers fear that government departments would take revenge on them in another time and in another way. 76 As we can see from the customs example, however, this is not necessarily the case. In that example, despite winning in both the first and second instance, the customs department still made an effort to bury the hatchet with the plaintiff.
One foreign lawyer with tremendous experience in China summed up his understanding of the prevailing view of administrative litigation in China as follows: preferring informal relationships to a reliance on rules and formal institutions. 86 Whatever truth there might be to these claims, it is exactly the kind of behavior that theories of legal convergence would expect foreign lawyers and business people to change rather than adopt.
Another alternative to litigation is to find a "business way" to work around problems with the state. For example, by cooperating with a Chinese company and using their license to enter into activities or areas for which official approval was not granted. 87 These types of solutions, however, are sometimes of dubious legality. The structure of VIEs, for example, is intended as a method of circumventing Chinese regulations. While the Chinese state has yet to come after VIEs directly, if problems arise litigation is unlikely to be a good option "because those contracts
[that make up a VIE] carry little legal weight, if any, in China." 88 Indeed, in some cases, foreign companies simply ignore Chinese law, and when a dispute arises they must resort to alternatives to litigation as they simply do not have a legal leg to stand on. While those that skirt them often perceive these laws as unfair, this behavior can hardly be considered to be contributing to the development of rule of law in China.
When multinationals are pursuing a strategy that is not particularly legal, they may not have any grounds for administrative litigation, but may find their clout nevertheless earns them ready solutions to such problems. In an admittedly extreme example, Carrefour, the world's 
Conclusion
Multinationals are not having the positive impact on China's legal system that they could because they prefer extra-legal solutions that they regard as less risky. I do not wish to suggest these individuals, be they lawyers, businessmen, or others, are negligent or dishonest when they decline to sue the Chinese state. They are following the common wisdom that is shared by their colleagues and taking the action they think is in the best interest of their clients or shareholders.
Nor would it be fair to conclude that foreign participation in China's legal system and markets has resulted in no progress towards legal convergence or the development of rule of law in
China. The example of Beijing's IP chamber shows that multinationals are willing to sue the Chinese state when they are comfortable that the system is sufficiently developed and they do not fear reprisals. If the Chinese state devoted more resources towards improving its courts and allowing them greater independence, multinationals would almost certainly be more willing to use them. At the same time, however, it is clear that foreign firms and governments, and multilateral institutions have not put the same pressure behind reforming other parts of the Chinese legal system.
My findings suggest the unsurprising conclusion that economic engagement is not a panacea when it comes to building the rule of law in an environment not very favorable to it. As with the IP Chamber of Beijing's court, a combination of diplomatic pressure, multinational organizations and foreign firms can contribute to legal convergence. Yet, multinationals will only contribute to the development of best practice institutions when they follow best practices.
The PRC has made this difficult by putting up barriers against the participation of foreign enterprises in many areas and then allowing extra-legal methods of subverting them.
Multinationals and the law firms that advise and represent them are profit-driven entities and 
